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PASTORAL POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY:
REFLECTIONS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF
THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS'
PASTORAL LETTER ON WAR
AND PEACE*
Robert A. Destro**
Taken as a whole, the Roman Catholic Bishops' 1983 pastoral
letter on war and peace, "The Challenge of Peace, God's Promise,
and Our Response"' has two purposes: first, to assist Catholics in the
formation of their consciences; and, second, to contribute to the ongo-
ing public policy debate concerning the morality of war in general,
and of nuclear war in particular.2 This article will address the stated
purposes of and the suggestions made in the pastoral letter from the
vantage point of American statutory and constitutional law. It will
make no attempt to provide definitive legal answers to the many ques-
tions raised by and in the letter, for there are none in this complex and
challenging area of law. Its purpose is to raise some of the practical
legal and moral questions which are critical to the conscientious
choices of the individuals to whom the letter is addressed: govern-
ment officials, citizens, members of the armed services, workers in de-
fense industries, clergy and religious and others.
The letter calls upon each person to whom it is addressed to
"probe the meaning of the moral choices which are ours as Chris-
tians"3 respecting the issue of nuclear war, and states that peace "is
the fruit of ideas and decisions taken in the political, cultural, social,
military, and legal sectors of life."' It correctly recognizes that con-
scientious choices are not made by individuals in a moral vacuum, but
by "citizens [who] wish to affirm [their] loyalty to [their] country and
* © 1986 Catholic University of America Press. A shorter version of this article was
published in PEACE IN A NUCLEAR AGE: THE BISHOPS' PASTORAL LETTER IN PERSPECTIVE
(C. REID ED. 1986).
** B.A., 1972, Miami University; J.D. 1975, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of
California, Berkeley. Assistant Professor of Law, Catholic University of America, Washing-
ton, D.C.; Member, United States Commission on Civil Rights.
1. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace, God's Promise and
Our Response, Washington, D.C. (May 3, 1983) [hereinafter cited in text as "pastoral letter"
or "letter"].
2. See id. [hereinafter cited in notes as "The Challenge of Peace"].
3. The Challenge of Peace at 67.
4. Id. at 21.
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its ideas" and who must also remain both "faithful to the universal
principles proclaimed by the Church" and sensitive to the needs of the
world as a whole.5
In keeping with this view, this article will sketch the structural
framework of the American statutory and constitutional law which
necessarily comes into play, formally or informally, whenever relig-
iously motivated citizens or religious institutions act in the public
sphere, or explicitly take action with legal effect and defend those ac-
tions on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs or teachings. Part
I discusses the constitutiomd and policy questions raised whenever
organized religious groups explicitly seek to involve themselves in the
political process. Part II discusses constitutional and statutory issues
raised whenever individual believers seek exemptions from social or
employer-imposed duties on religious grounds.
I. INTRODUCTION
Religious Freedom in American Law
American law has valued religious freedom as an essential ele-
ment of individual liberty and civil society from its earliest begin-
nings. When the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth in 1620, they intended
that the newly-formed Massachusetts Bay Colony would be as a bibli-
cal "city on a hill."' 6 In 1952 the late United States Supreme Court
Justice William 0. Douglas frankly recognized that "[w]e are a reli-
gious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."7 The
American people and their ]leaders have defended and fostered free-
dom of conscience as an important dimension of our understanding of
religious freedom. Express legislative 8 and judicial action has been
taken to protect and continue the ongoing constitutional commit-
ment9 to provide maximum protection for religious belief and
5. Id. at 326.
6. "Wee shall be ... ] as a Citty upon a Hill, the eies of all people are uppon us; soe that
if wee shall deal falsely with our god in this worke wee have undertaken and soe cause him to
withdrawe his present help from us, wee shall be made a story and a by-word through the
world." John Winthrop, "A Model of Christian Charity" (1630), a sermon delivered aboard
the Arbella, quoted in D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICAN: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 3 (New
York: Vintage Books, 1958).
7. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952).
8. See, e.g., Virginia Declaration of Rights, Art. 16 (1776); Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Title VII §§ 7010), 702, 703(e)(1,2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., 78 Stat. 255 (employment
discrimination); 20 U.S.C. § 4071, P.L. 98-377, 98 Stat. 1303 ("The Equal Access Act"); 29
U.S.C § 169 (religious objections to union membership).
9. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VII, cl.3, U.S. CONsT. amend I; CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 4
(West, 1983); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3, 25A FLA. STATS ANN. art. I, § 3.
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practice.
In the early years, protection for individual religious belief and
conscience was seen as the logical extension of a theological and
moral imperative. In his famous "Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments,"" ° James Madison argued that:
[R]eligion, or the duty we owe to our creator, and the manner of
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not
by force or violence. The Religion then of every man must be left
to the conviction and conscience of every man, and it is the right of
every man to exercise it as these may dictate ....
... It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such hom-
age, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This
duty is precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation to
the claims of Civil Society.
Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he
must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe:
And if a member of Civil Society, who enters into any subordinate
Association, must always do it with a reservation of his duty to the
general authority; much more must every man who becomes a
member of any particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of his
allegiance to the Universal Sovereign."
In Madison's view, it was critical that each individual should be re-
sponsible only to God for abuses of this freedom,12 and that the rights
of all religious believers and dissenters should be placed on an equal
footing. 13 This view was carried forward into his first draft of what
later became the first amendment to the Constitution of the United
States:14
The Civil Rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious
belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor
shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, nor
on any pretext infringed.15
10. J. Madison, "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments" (1785)
quoted in, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
[hereinafter "Memorial and Remonstrance"].
11. Id. at 1 (note in the original to "Va. Decl. Rights, Art. 16"). Compare The Chal-
lenge of Peace at 326.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides, in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "
15. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (June 8, 1789), quoted in M.J. MALBIN, RELIGION &
POLITIcs 4 (1978). This version of the proposed amendment, along with one which would
have prohibited the states from "violat[ing] the equal rights of conscience or the freedom of the
press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases," went through several modifications before it
emerged in its present form from a House-Senate conference committee comprised of Reps.
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Although the language of Madison's proposal seems tailored spe-
cifically to accommodate the needs of the present-day conscientious
religious dissenter,16 neither its author,17 nor the individual whose
views have been most influential in shaping the contemporary Ameri-
can understanding of the constitutional guarantee of religious free-
dom, Thomas Jefferson,"8 would have given it a particularly expansive
reading in cases when religious belief was in clear conflict with the
requirements of either the public order or the public welfare.1 9
In Jefferson's view, a clear distinction could be drawn between
two aspects of religious liberty: belief and action. In his 1802 letter to
the Danbury Baptists,20 Jefferson stated that because "religion is a
James Madison (Va.), Roger Sherman (Conn.) and John Vining (Del.) and Senators Oliver
Ellsworth (Conn.), Charles Carroll (Md.), and William Patterson (N.J.). The committee's
language was accepted by the House and Senate on September 24-25, 1789, respectively. See
id., 13-14. The Senate had rejected an amendment which would have prohibited the states
from infringing upon the equal rights of conscience. I ANNALS OF CONGRESS at 72 (Sept. 7,
1789), Id. at 13, note 34.
16. Compare text accompanying notes 80-95 infra.
17. A good statement of Madison's views on the extent to which sincerely held religious
belief might be set up in opposition to government authority appears in Madison's 1832 Letter
to Reverend Adams, in which he stated that "it may not be easy, in every possible case, to
trace the line of separation between the rights of religion and the Civil authority with such
distinctness as to avoid collisions and doubts on unessential points." Letter from James
Madison to Reverend Adams (November, 1832), reprinted in IX THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 485 (G. Hunt ed. 1909), quoted in Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious
Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. LouIs
U. L. REV. 205, 223 (1980). Madison fully accepted the proposition that "no other rule exists,
by which any question which may divide a society, can be ultimately determined, but the will
of the majority" and felt that all believers were best served by an equality principle forbidding
the "subjecting of some to peculiar burdens [and] granting to others peculiar exemptions." See
"Memorial and Remonstrance," supra note 10, at 1, 4. It is particularly relevant to the
present topic that Madison chose "the Quakers and Menonists" as examples of religious
groups whose beliefs ought not to "be endowed above all others, with extraordinary privileges,
by which prostelytes may be enticed from all others." Id. at 4. Compare text accompanying
notes 77, 78, 81 infra.
18. Although Thomas Jefferson was not involved in the drafting of the first amendment,
his views on the proper relationship of church and state form the starting point for contempo-
rary analysis. Jefferson's letter of 1802 to the Danbury Baptists is the source of the now-
famous metaphor, "a wall of separation between Church and State", which has influenced the
outcome of nearly all cases involving the religion clauses since 1947. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1 (1947). Whether the Jeffersonian view of "separation" is appropriate given the language
and history of the first amendment is a topic beyond the scope of this article. Compare, Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2508 (Rehnquist J., dissenting) with id. at 2481
(majority opinion per Stevens, J.).
19. See generally, Little, Thomas Jefferson's Religious Views and Their Influence on the
Supreme Court's Interpretation of the First Amendment, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 57 (1976); MAL-
BIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra, note 15, at 25-29.
20. Letter of Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, (Jan-
uary 1, 1802), reprinted in A. KOCH & IV. REDEN, THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 332-33 (1944).
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matter which lies solely between a man and his God... the legislative
powers of government reach action only, and not opinions."'" This
distinction, between beliefs, which are deserving of absolute protec-
tion, and religiously motivated actions, which may be regulated
"when [religious] principles break out into overt acts against peace
and good order,"22 has been accepted as a truism by most courts de-
ciding cases involving religious freedom claims,2" for Jefferson was
"convinced that [man] has no natural right in opposition to his social
duties."24
The holdings of the United States Supreme Court on the topic
since 1963 are somewhat inconsistent with the Jeffersonian view of
deference to be accorded to religious conscience when it comes into
conflict with legislatively determined social duty.25 Although an ex-
haustive treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper,
2 6
those cases do provide a good framework for analysis of the relevant
constitutional principles to be applied when a religious liberty claim
based on the pastoral letter is made by a member of one of the groups
21. Id.
22. J. BOYD, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (1950), quoted in Little, supra,
note 19, at 62, nf. 27-29.
23. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940) where the Court
stated:
[The Constitution] forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to
such religious organizations or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot
be restricted by law .... [Free Exercise] embraces two concepts-freedom to believe
and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be .... [The] freedom to act must have appropriate definition to preserve the
enforcement of that protection. . . . [although] the power to regulate must be so
exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected
freedom.
Where the distinction between belief and action has been the starting point for the judicial
analysis of a free exercise claim, the result is commonly the rejection of the religious claim.
See, e.g., United States v. American Friends Service Committee, 419 U.S. 7 (1974) (levy on
Quaker funds); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (enforcement of Sunday closing laws
against Orthodox Jews); Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 633
(1934) (military training); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 154 (1878) (polygamy).
24. Letter of Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, supra
note 20.
25. Compare, e.g., Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Divi-
sion, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), with, e.g., United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437 (1971); Autenreith v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd sub
nom. Autenreith v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. den., 397 U.S. 1036 (1970).
26. See generally, Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L.REV. 327
(1969); Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: A Sociological Approach, 67 MICH. L. REV. 679
(1969); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development-Part I. The
Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1967); Marcus, The Forum of Con-
science: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217.
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specified in the pastoral letter on which this paper focuses public offi-
cials, clergy and religious, the military, civilian employees in defense
industries, and the citizenry at large.27
II
A. Pastoral Direction of Public Officials and Catholics as Citizens:
Constitutional and Public Policy Implications.
For purposes of American constitutional law, the legal principles
governing the activities of religiously motivated public officials are, in
large part, the same as those which govern the citizenry at large. To
be sure, the constitutionally prescribed oath taken by each federal offi-
cial to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States"2
imposes a higher degree of responsibility and adherence to constitu-
tional norms upon the public official than it does on the citizen.29 Ulti-
mately, however, control of the acts of public officials is relegated by
the Constitution to the political process."0
27. See Parts II and III, infra rega:rding the political process and defense workers. The
questions arising for military personnel are similar to those which apply to defense workers,
but the room for permissible dissent and accommodation is far more narrow.
28. The Presidential oath of office is set forth verbatim in U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8. The
oath of office for all other federal officials, including members of Congress, judges and execu-
tive officials, and for members of every state's legislature must include an oath or affirmation to
support the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
29. By its terms, the Constitution speaks only to the structure and operation of the federal
system: (i.e., to the federal government federal officials, the states and state officials). In only
one instance does it speak directly to the rights of individuals, rather than imposing a limit on
the power of government, and, even then, it does so by negative implication. Compare, U.S.
CONsT. amend XIII (abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude directly) with U.S. Const.
Amend. XV (right to vote shall not be infringed "by the United States or by any State"). For
generalized discussion of the implications of the "state action" doctrine, see generally, LOCK-
HART, KAMISAR, CHOPER AND SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1410-71 (6th ed. West
1986).
30. Political control of the legislative branch is accomplished through three basic meth-
ods: election (art. I, § 2); presidential veto of enactments (art. I, § 7,. cl 2, 3); expulsion and
control of members (art. I, § 5, cl. 1, 2). Political control of the executive is exercised through
six basic methods: election (art. II, § 1); impeachment (art. II, § 4; art. I, § 2 cl.5; § 3, cl. 6);
the power to advise and consent to nominations and treaties (art. II,§ 2 cl. 2); the Congres-
sional power of the purse (art. I, § 7, cl. 1, § 8, § 9, cl. 7)); and the power to override Presiden-
tial vetos (art. I, § 7, cl. 3). Political control over judicial authority is accomplished; through
legislation resting on an express constitutional power, Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966); impeachment (art. I, § 4, art. III, § 1); control of the Supreme Court's appellate juris-
diction (art. III, § 2); and by self-restraint in the exercise of the power of judicial review of
legislative or executive action. Political control over the entire federal system is guaranteed
through the dual method for proposing constitutional amendments provided in Article V: the
first is legislative and depends entirely on the will of Congress, the second is also legislative, but
rests upon the authority of a special convention called for the purpose by the Congress upon
petition of three-fourths of the states. Interestingly, no member of Congress may, at the same
time, sit as a member of such a convention, art. I, § 6, cl. 2, (the Incompatibility Clause) thus
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The question for citizens, politicians, and public officials, there-
fore, is the degree to which they should permit their religious views to
influence their voting patterns or their official activities. Not surpris-
ingly, this question evokes sharp responses and critical commentary
whenever it surfaces on the American political scene.31 It dominated
the presidential campaigns of Al Smith 32 in 1928 and John F. Ken-
nedy in 1960.33 President Jimmy Carter was often criticized for his
use of "born again" religious language and rhetoric. 34 The 1984 Pres-
idential campaign witnessed an ongoing debate among politicians
themselves35 and between church leaders,36 politicians, 37 and com-
assuring that "incompatible" political allegiances will not develop. Butcf, Schlesinger v. Re-
servists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 108 (1974) (action based on Incompatibility
Clause dismissed for want of standing). In either case, proposed constitutional amendments
must be ratified by the requisite number of state legislatures or state ratifying conventions, as
specified by Congress. Art. V. The convention method, which has never been used under this
Constitution but which produced it, has become a politically controversial issue of late, in
large part because approximately 32 of the 34 states needed to call a convention have peti-
tioned the Congress to do so. See Washington Post, October 2, 1984, p. A4, col. 2. On the
topic of the political nature of the amendment process, see generally Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433 (1939).
31. See generally, W. Berns, "The Nation and the Bishops," Wall Street Journal, Decem-
ber 15, 1982, p 28W. col. 3; E. Goodman, "Bishops as Bosses," Washington Post, September
11, 1984, p. A.23 col. 1; J. Kraft, "Debate Among Catholics," Washington Post, September
18, 1984, p. A19 col. 1; J. Lofton, "Jackson Debases Religion, Politics," Washington Times,
September 5, 1984, p.3A col. 1; C. Rowan, "An Unnatural Alliance," Washington Post, Sep-
tember 16, 1984, p. B8, col. 2.
32. 0. HANDLIN, AL SMITH AND HIs AMERICA (1958); G. MYERS, BIGOTRY (1940).
33. Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy Before a Meeting of the Greater Houston Min-
isterial Assn., Houston, Texas, September 12, 1960.
34. See J. Johnson, "A Born Again Style at the White House," Washington Post, January
21, 1977, p. A18, col. 3.
35. Remarks of President Ronald W. Reagan to the Ecumenical Prayer Breakfast, Dallas,
Texas, August 23, 1984; Remarks of Walter F. Mondale to the International Convention of
B'nai B'rith, Washington, D.C., September 6, 1984; Senator Edward M. Kennedy, "Faith and
Freedom," delivered at Tavern on the Green, New York City, before the Coalition of Con-
science, September 10, 1984; Governor Mario M. Cuomo, "Religious Belief and Public Mo-
rality: A Catholic Governor's Perspective" delivered to the Department of Theology,
University of Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana, September 13, 1984; Representative Henry J.
Hyde, "Keeping God in the Closet: Some Thoughts on the Exorcism of Religious Values from
Public Life," delivered at the Thomas J. White Center on Law & Government, School of Law,
University of Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana, September 24, 1984.
36. See, e.g., Bernardin, "Role of the Religious Leader in the Development of Public Pol-
icy" in Symposium: The Religious Leader and Public Policy, 2 J. LAW & REL. 367, 369 (1984);
Gaffney, Biblical Religion and American Politics: Some Historical and Theological Reflections,
I J. LAW & REL. 171 (1983). K.A. Briggs, "Catholic Theologians Have Mixed Reactions to
Cuomo's Notre Dame Talk," New York Times, September 17, 1984 p. B12 col. 3; H. Cox,
"Our Politics Needs Religion," Washington Post, September 2, 1984, p. D8, col. 1; R.D. Mc-
Fadden, "Episcopal Bishop Says Officials Must Put Law Before Tenets," New York Times,
September 17, 1984, p. B12, col 1.
37. "Ferraro Denies Charges on Abortion" Washington Post, September 11, 1984, p. A9,
col. 2; G. Larder, "Cuomo Urges Wider Debate of Religion," Washington Post, August 4,
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nentators38 on the "proper" role of religion in political action and
discourse.39 Most recently, political commentators have begun to
comment on the legitimacy of a 1988 Presidential campaign by a min-
ister widely known for his teltevision ministry.4°
Although phrased most often in popular parlance as a matter of
"separation of church and state, '41 the concept of "separation of
church and state" is neither useful, nor particularly relevant when
religiously motivated individuals seek to draw upon their religious or
moral belief systems as sources for public policy choices 2.4  The real
1984, p. A5, col. 1; McNeill-Lehrer News Hour, P.B.S., Sept. 11, 1982, segment 2, (Robin
McNeill and Charlayne Hunter-Gault interview with Archbishop Bernard Law of Boston and
Senator William Mitchell of Maine).
38. See generally R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOC-
RACY IN AMERICA (1984). See also, R. Cohen, "Religion: Reagan's Divider. ..", Washington
Post, September 5, 1984, p. A19, col. 1; R. Evans & R. Novak, "... And Mondale's Wedge,"
Washington Post, September 5, 1984 p. A19, col. 4; N. Hentoff, "Bishops, Bigots ... , " Wash-
ington Post, September 21, 1984 p. A21, col. 1; J. Kraft, "Elmer Gantry Time," Washington
Post, September 6, 1984, p. A21, 01. 1; W. McPhereson, "God and Man in Dallas," Washing-
ton Post, September 4, 1984, p. A19, col. 5; W. Pruden "The Shootout at God's Corral,"
Washington Times, September 5, 1984, p. 2A col. 1; W. Pruden "'Holy War' Pits North vs.
South," Washington Times, September 19, 1984, p. 2A, col. 1; J. Sobran, "Of Political Piety
and Pandering," Washington Times, September 6, 1984, p. 2C, col. 2; E.M. Yoder, Jr., "Reli-
gion's Place," Washington Post, August 29, 1984, p. A25 col. 6; E.M. Yoder, Jr., "The Pope's
Example," Washington Post, September 6, 1984, p. A21, col. 1. See also sources cited note 31,
supra.
39. See also, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), rev'g, McRae v. Califano, 491 F.
Supp. 630 (E.D. N.Y. 1980) (discussing the role of religion in the political process when the
issue is one which is commonly identified with particular religious traditions). See also text at
notes 68-78 infra.
40. See, e.g., G. Epps, "Pat Robertson's a Pastor, But His Father Was a Pol," Washington
Post, October 19, 1986, p. HI, col. 4. For a discussion of the issue of clergy holding public
office, see text and notes 65-69 infra.
41. The United States Constitution does not contain the phrase "separation of church and
state" but rather the following admonitions respecting limits on governmental activity:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.... U.S. CONST. amend. I .... [N]o religious Test shall ever
be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States"
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
42. As a practical matter, there has never been "absolute separation" of church and state
in the United States. The language of first amendment ("Congress shall make no law") itself
bears witness to the desire of the framers of the Constitution to leave intact then-existing state
established churches, see, e.g., C.J. A]NTIEAU, A.T. DOWNEY, E.C. ROBERTS, FREEDOM
FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT (1964), and contemporaneous statutory enactments make it
clear that religion and morality were important factors influencing public discourse. See, e.g.,
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, as adopted by Congress, Statutes of 1789, c.8 (August 7, 1789)
("Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, schools and the means of education shall be forever encouraged."); J. STORY, II
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Ch. XLIV § 1870-1879
(1851). George Washington's farewell address also made the point:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and mo-
rality are indispensable supports ... let it simply be asked where is the security for
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issue is the political role of religious discourse and influence in the
development of public policy on issues of great public importance.
In their letter, the Bishops correctly recognize that "public opin-
ion ... can, through a series of measures, indicate the limits beyond
which a government should not proceed. '43 This is especially true in
a representative democracy such as the United States, where the elec-
tronic and print media regularly report the latest public opinion pol-
ling results on issues of importance, and politicians regularly consult
the latest figures. As a result, the immediate problem for the Bishops
is how to define the permissible limits of the task they have set out to
accomplish "in concert with public officials, analysts, private organi-
zations and the media to set limits beyond which our military policy
should not move in word or action.""
Some of the current political interpretations of American
church-state principles would place severe constraints on the permis-
sibility of such participation,45 and events in the 1984 presidential
campaign show clearly that attempts by church leaders to "encourage
a public attitude which sets stringent limits on the kind of actions our
own government and other governments will take" 46 on issues of ma-
prosperity, for reputation, for life-if the sense of religious obligation desert... and
let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without
religion.
D.H. MATHESON, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
569-70 (1941), quoted in ANTIEAU, supra at 188. During the nineteenth century, the federal
government took an active part in assuring the spread of organized religion in the territories,
see, e.g., Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (Indian treaty funds could be used to finance
education for Indians in Catholic schools on grounds that funds were Indian property); Brad-
field v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (payments to Catholic hospital); Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (exemption from immigration law; the Court
insisted that government must be friendly toward religion); and in limiting religious practices
deemed to be harmful to the public interest, Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (polygamy). Examples of close interaction and protection
can be multiplied. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Since the late 1940s, a more "absolutist" view has begun to take root in Supreme Court
decisions, but even that is far from being either consistent or "absolute". See, e.g., Aguilar v.
Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Valley Forge Chris-
tian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982);
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 28 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Compare
American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 786 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. den.,
55 U.S.L.W. 3249 (October 21, 1986) (taxpayers have no standing to challenge appointment of
ambassador to Vatican). See generally, Hastings, United States - Vatican Relations, 69 CATH.
His'r. REV. 20 (1958); Marrero, The Closing of the American Diplomatic Mission to the Vatican
and Efforts to Revive It, 1868-1870, 33 CATH. HIST. REV. 423 (1948).
43. The Challenge of Peace 1 140.
44. The Challenge of Peace 141.
45. See sources cited at notes 31-40, supra.
46. The Challenge of Peace 141.
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jor political and social importance-such as nuclear war or abor-
tion-can have predictable consequences for both political leaders
and the electorate at large.
In order to probe the issue of "religion in politics" in a useful
way, however, it is necessary to set out a few of the constitutional
ground rules which govern religiously based attempts to influence the
course of public policy. There are statutory rules as well ,4' but they
too must be seen in light of the constitutional principles which govern
the discussion from the outseL.
The most critical of these constitutional considerations are the
other rights protected by the first amendment: the express rights of
freedom of speech, press, and peaceable assembly, and the right to
petition government for a redress of grievances; as well as the implied
right of freedom of association.48 Taken together, these rights serve
as a powerful shield protecting virtually all political speech49 from
government regulation.50 As a result, any attempt to limit speech in-
tended to influence public officials or public opinion on the basis of
either the identity of the speaker 51 or the content of the message
5 2
47. See note 87, infra.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The right to freedom of association is not expressly mentioned
in the Constitution, but has been implied as being necessary to protect those rights which are
express. See generally, Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
49. See generally Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980); First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214
(1966). See also Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971); J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); R. Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The
Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 Sup. Cr. REV. 1.
50. But see F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (sustaining FCC regula-
tions which limited the use of vulgar language during certain hours); Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (limitation on political advertising in public transit vehicles);
Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (limitation on demonstration on jail property); Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (government may impose reasonable "time, place and manner"
restrictions on speech).
51. For purposes of this discussion, the only relevant identity- based restrictions would be
1) limits on the ability of church officials to speak on political matters; 2) limits on the ability
of politicians to address issues; and 3) limits imposed on the citizenry at large.
52. Content-based regulations are presumptively unconstitutional, Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dep't of the City of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), and the government must demonstrate a "clear and present
danger of imminent lawless action" before such regulation can be justified. See Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In practice,, attempts by government to regulate speech with a
political impact have rarely succeeded. See, e.g., National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S.
43 (1977); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) ("Pentagon Papers");
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); but see United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F.Supp.
990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), (preliminary injunction against publication of directions for building
hydrogen bomb upheld), request for writ of mandamus denied sub. nom. Morland v. Sprecher,
443 U.S. 709 (1979), dismissed as moot, Nos. 79-1438, 79-1664 (7th Cir., Oct. 1, 1979).
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would be subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny. 3
Thus, the first question for discussion is the degree to which
American traditions of church-state relations54 should limit relig-
iously motivated speech designed to influence public policy on any
question of political significance, including war and peace. Phrased in
this manner, however, the question becomes not merely one of consti-
tutional law, but a political issue of major significance.
Although a discussion of the politics of religious influence on
political debate is beyond the scope of this article, examination of the
underlying constitutional rules which should guide the discussion
sheds considerable light on the "religion in politics" issues which cap-
tured so much public attention during the 1984 presidential cam-
paign.55 Review of the cases and relevant statutes makes it clear that
the debate over religion as a force in American politics is based more
on philosophical and political considerations than it is on constitu-
tional rules.
Aside from the most obvious professional distinctions to be
drawn among church leaders, politicians and interested members of
the public, all are entitled to the general political rights of citizenship:
to speak out on issues,56 to run for public office,57 and to take an ac-
tive part in political campaigns and debates. 58 Traditionally, the only
53. The "clear and present danger' standard represents the highest standard of judicial
review in American constitutional law, for it allocates the entire burden of proving an ex-
traordinary degree of justification to the government, which must rebut the presumption of
unconstitutionality discussed in the previous note. See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-9 to 12-11 (West, 1978); NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 853-865 (West 3d ed., 1986).
54. See text at notes 6-25, supra.
55. See political commentary cited in notes 31-38 and 40, supra.
56. See text at notes 48-53, supra. The Speech and Debate Clause of the U.S. CONSTITU-
TION, art. I, § 6, confers a broad privilege for speech by elected legislators when acting in their
legislative capacities. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). See generally, Reinstein & Silvergate, Legislative Privilege and the
Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1973).
57. Although Pope John Paul II has indicated that Catholic clergy and religious should
not hold public office, W. Brown, "Pope John Paul II Bars Priests from Serving in Public
Office," Washington Post, May 5, 1980, p. Al, col. 1, nothing in American constitutional law
would prevent them from doing so. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; amend. I, McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618 (1978).
58. There are limitations on the ability of church leaders to use church facilities and tax-
exempt funds for political purposes, see generally materials cited in note 87, infra, and gener-
ally applicable campaign spending limits for federal election campaigns. Federal Election
Campaign Act, as amended, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-441, 451-455; 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1503; 18 U.S.C.
26 U.S.C. §§ 276, 6012, 9002-9012, 9031-9042; 42 U.S.C. § 5043; 47 U.S.C. §§ 312, 315; Pub.
Laws 92-255, Feb. 7, 1972, 86 Stat. 3; 93-443, Oct. 15, 1974, 88 Stat. 1263; 94-283, Title I, §§
101- 1 5(f, h, i), Title II, §§ 201-210, Title 111 §§ 310, 312, May 11, 1976, 90 Stat. 475-496; 95-
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constitutional arguments against such participation have arisen when
the speaker or official is a member of the clergy,59 or when the issue
itself can be characterized as a religiously based or motivated issue
such as abortion, school prayer, or support for religiously affiliated,
nonpublic schools. 6° The rationale advanced in support of constitu-
tional restrictions in these policy areas has generally been that debates
over religious issues, especially those led by clergy, are politically "di-
visive" and merit strict judicial oversight.6 '
In recent years, the Supreme Court has spoken clearly on the
"political divisiveness" issue on two major occasions. The first, a case
challenging the right of a Baptist clergyman to hold elective political
office.62 The Supreme Court of Tennessee had ruled that Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution of 179663 barred clergy from
holding seats in the Tennessee: legislature, and supported its judgment
on the grounds that the participation of clergy in legislative debates
could foster divisiveness along religious lines and might lead to the
enactment of religiously preferential laws.' The Supreme Court re-
versed in a series of opinions which were in agreement regarding the
result, but divided as to the proper approach. 65 Of the various posi-
127, Oct. 12, 1977, 91 Stat. 1110; 95- 216, Title V, § 502(a), Dec. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 1504-1565;
96-187, Jan. 8, 1980, 93 Stat. 1339.
59. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), rev'g, Paty v. McDaniel, 547 S.W.2d
897 (Tenn., 1977).
60. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (prayer); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980) (abortion); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (nonpublic schools); Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (student transportation).
61. Such a theory of judicial oversight raises substantial questions regarding the role of
the judiciary in a representative democracy. Such questions are, for the most part, beyond the
scope of this paper. On this topic, see generally A. HAMILTON, J. MADISON, J. JAY, THE
FEDERALIST (No. 78) (1788).
62. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). This case took on added significance during
the 1984 Presidential campaign when the Rev. Jesse Jackson announced his candidacy for the
Democratic Party's nomination for the presidency. Compare text at note 40, supra.
63. The Tennessee Constitution of 1796 provided:
Whereas ministers of the gospel are, by their profession, dedicated to God and the
care of Souls, and ought not to be diverted from the great duties of their functions,
therefore, no minister of the gospel, or priest of and denomination whatever, shall be
eligible to a seat in either house of the legislature." TENN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
(1796).
Seven of the original states (Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
New York and Delaware) disqualified clergy from legislative office. Three of the seven (New
York, Delaware, and South Carolina) barred clergy from holding any political office. McDan-
iel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 622 & note 3 (1978), quoting L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND
FREEDOM 118 (Rev. ed. 1967).
64. See Paty v. McDaniel, 547 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1977).
65. Chief Justice Burger, joined Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens, argued that the
Tennessee constitutional provision impermissibly conditioned Rev. McDaniel's right to free
exercise of religion on the surrender of his right to seek public office. The Chief Justice cited
PASTORAL POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
tions taken, perhaps the most succinct and relevant to the present
inquiry was made by Justices William Brennan and Thurgood
Marshall:
The state's goal of preventing sectarian bickering and strife may
not be accomplished by regulating religious speech and political
association. The Establishment Clause does not license govern-
ment to treat religion and those who teach and practice it, simply
by virtue of their status as such, as subversive of American ideals
and therefore subject to unique disabilities .... In short, govern-
ment may not as a goal promote "safe thinking" with respect to
religion and fence out from political participation those, such as
ministers, whom it regards as over involved with religion. Reli-
gionists no less than members of any other group enjoy the full
measure of protection afforded speech, association, and political as-
sociation generally. The Establishment Clause, properly under-
stood, is a shield against any attempt by government to inhibit
religion as it has done here .... It may not be used as a sword to
justify repression of religion or its adherents from any aspect of
public life.66
Having disposed of the argument that clergy should have no
place in legislative chambers in McDaniel v. Paty, it remained to be
seen just how far the Court's "political divisiveness" standard67 for
cases would be taken in a case involving allegedly "religious" issues or
the active involvement of religious institutions or believers in the
political process at large. 6 That opportunity finally arose in Harris v.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) as the controlling case. Sherbert is discussed at some
length in the text accompanying notes 150-163, infra. Justice Brennan joined by Justice Mar-
shall, argued that the prohibition was a religious test absolutely prohibited by U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 3, and Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); that it imposed an impermissible
burden on the rights conferred by the Free Exercise Clause, citing Sherbert; and violated the
Establishment Clause by establishing a religiously based classification which had a primary
effect of inhibiting religion, 435 U.S. at 630. Justice Stewart argued that Torcaso alone con-
trolled the case because it was directed at prohibitions which do not turn on statements of
belief, but upon action dictated by belief. 435 U.S. at 643. See also text at notes 16-25, supra.
Justice White argued that the prohibition violated the Equal Protection Clause of the four-
teenth amendment, and that it was both underinclusive and overinclusive. 435 U.S. at 644.
66. McDaniel v. Paty, supra, 435 U.S. at 641 (Brennan and Marshall, J.J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
67. The "political divisiveness" argument had its genesis in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664 (1970), when the late Justice John Harlan cited one sentence in Professor Paul
Freund's article, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L.Rev 1680 (1969), to support the
idea that highly charged political controversies such as debates over the funding for church-
related schools "engender a risk of politicizing religion" and that "history cautions that polit-
ical fragmentation on sectarian lines must be guarded against." 397 U.S. at 695.
68. By the time the Court decided Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the "polit-
ical divisiveness" argument had become what appeared to be an additional factor to be consid-
ered in first amendment cases involving the Religion Clauses. In Lemon the Court formalized
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McRae,69 a challenge to Congress' refusal to provide Medicaid fund-
ing for abortions. ° In McRae, the plaintiffs, which included the City
of New York, welfare rights organizations and several religious
groups,71 argued that the statutory refusal to pay for abortions-com-
monly referred to as the "Hyde Amendment" '72-imposed "one reli-
gious view" (i. e., the Catholic view) on the community regarding the
humanity of the unborn and the morality of abortion. From this, it
was argued that the identity of the religious view allegedly imposed
could be proved by examining the religious identity, motives, and ac-
tivities of the major participants in the political debate (e.g., the tac-
tics and positions of the major lobby groups and sponsors of the
legislation).73
The practical effect of accepting such an argument and allowing
such "proof" as relevant evidence in constitutional litigation would
what has since become known as a "three-pronged" test for "secular purpose," a "primary
effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion," and lack of "excessive entanglement" be-
tween religion and government, 403 U.S. at 612-613. It also seemed to raise the "potential"
for division along religious lines to the status of an independent factor in constitutional analy-
sis, see, 403 U.S. at 622-624. Although the "political divisiveness" point was arguably unnec-
essary to the Court's decision, the Court apparently felt some need to speak on the issue. Chief
Justice Burger's opinion for the Court states flatly that " [i]t conflicts with our whole history
and tradition to permit questions of the Religion Clauses to assume such importance in our
legislatures and in our elections that they could divert attention from the myriad issues and
problems that confront every level of government[,]" and that it was unwise to force" candi-
dates to declare and voters to choose" on such issues. 403 U.S. at 623. When the Court has
been forced to consider the full implication of "the political divisiveness" argument in the
context of individual participation in the political process, however, it has backed away. See
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (attempted invalidation of Congressional spending re-
strictions on divisiveness grounds); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (exclusion of clergy
from state legislative post based, in part, on potential for political "divisiveness" on religious
grounds. But see, Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S.Ct. 3232, 3239 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (rais-
ing political divisiveness issue). See also Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PiTT. L. REV. 673 (1980); Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along
Religious Lines.- The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST.
Louis U. L. REV. 205 (1980); Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten
Year Assessment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1995 (1980).
69. 448 U.S. 297 (1980), decided together with Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
70. Act of September 30, 1976, Pub. L. 94-493, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976); Act of December 9,
1977, Pub. L. 95-205 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977); Act of October 18, 1978, Pub. L. 95-480
§ 210, 92 Stat. 1586 (1978 ; Act of November 20, 1979, Pub. L. 96-123 § 109, 93 Stat. 926
(1980).
71. Among the plaintiffs in the McRae case were: Cora McRae, the Women's Division of
the Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church, and the Health & Hospitals
Corporation of the City of New York.
72. The statute, an amendment to numerous appropriations bills in addition to the ones
cited in note 70, supra, bears the name of its original proponent, Rep. Henry Hyde of Illinois.
73. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); See First Amended Complaint of Plaintiffs,
McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. N.Y. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Harris v. McRae,
supra.
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be twofold: first, the high profile involvement of clergy and relig-
iously motivated individuals in public policy debates involving contro-
versial issues would become a negative factor to be considered in later
constitutional controversies over the validity of the challenged legisla-
tion; and, second, religious rhetoric in political debates would be per-
ceived as an impermissible, or at least suspicious, influence on the
course of the political debate. To the degree such evidence would be
considered persuasive or relevant to the constitutional validity of leg-
islative or other political action, overt religiously motivated involve-
ment or overtly religious political rhetoric would be judicially
discouraged.
The Court responded to this novel-and constitutionally sus-
pect 74-application of the "divisiveness" rationale with an affirma-
tion, albeit a grudging one,75 of the role of religious and moral ideas in
the formulation of public policy.
Although neither a State nor the Federal Government can consti-
tutionally 'pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another,' Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U S. 1, 15, . . . ,it does not follow that a statute violates the
Establishment Clause because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize
with the tenets of some or all religions.' McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 442,.... That the Judeo-Christian religions oppose
stealing does not mean that a State or the Federal Government
may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, enact laws
prohibiting larceny. Ibid. The Hyde Amendment, as the District
Court noted, is as much a reflection of 'traditionalist' values to-
wards abortion, as it is an embodiment of the views of any particu-
lar religion. 491 F. Supp. at 741. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.,
74. See notes 49-53, supra, and accompanying text.
75. In his opinion for the majority in Harris v. McRae, Justice Stewart made the tradi-
tional comment that "[i]t is not the mission of this Court or any other to decide whether the
balance of competing interests reflected in the Hyde Amendment is wise social policy[,]" 448
U.S. at 326, but added, somewhat uncharacteristically, that "[i]f that were our mission, not
every Justice who has subscribed to the judgment of the Court today could have done so." Id.
Justice Marshall was not so circumspect regarding the nature of the process and the role of the
Supreme Court. Justice Marshall's dissent argued that the Court should never have permitted
such a highly charged issue to be exposed to the normal political process because ". . . the
Court's decisions [in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); and
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977)] [were] an invitation to public officials, already under
extraordinary pressure from well-financed and carefully orchestrated lobbying campaigns, to
approve more such restrictions on governmental funding for abortion", 448 U.S. at 337 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 9; Brief of Rep. Jim Wright, et al, and
Certain Other Members of Congress of the United States as Amici Curiae, Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980) (arguing that under art. I, § 7, cl. 9 of the United States Constitution, the
Court had no constitutional authority to order an appropriation from the Treasury where
Congress had expressly refused to exercise its spending power). See also note 30, supra.
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at 138-41 ..... In sum, we are convinced that the fact that the
funding restrictions in the Hyde Amendment may coincide with
the religious tenets of the Roman Catholic Church does not, with-
out more, contravene the Establishment Clause.76
76. 448 U.S. at 319-20. Although the decisions in McDaniel v. Paty and Harris v. Mc-
Rae constitute a rejection of the most extreme applications of the political divisiveness argu-
ment, the theme that religion as a driving force in the body politic is politically divisive and
constitutionally suspect runs like a strong undercurrent through the writings of Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, Powell and Blackmun. Although a thorough discussion of their apparent dis-
dain for religious involvement in political affairs is beyond the scope of this article, it does
deserve some attention here. See generally sources cited note 68, supra.
From a review of their writings on religious involvement in the political process, it ap-
pears that the problem arises when the object or result of that involvement is to modify or
challenge the scope or direction of judicially established public policy. The contrast between
the approach taken by several of these justices in Harris and McDaniel illustrates the point.
Where, as in McDaniel, the use of the political divisiveness argument limits the ability of
clergy to run for political office, Justices, Marshall and Brennan speak eloquently concerning
the right of individuals to make their voices heard on the floor of legislative councils. Where
the issue is not the identity of the speaker, but the topic presented for discussion, the views of
both Justice Brennan and Marshall are different. Where the issue is controversial, and reli-
gious groups have articulated strong moral positions in opposition to those taken by the courts,
these justices appear to believe that the judiciary has a special role in assuring that the political
process is not tainted by divisive debates over the relative merits of issues having moral or
religious dimensions. In their opinion, such issues should be decided by the courts. Justice
Brennan, whose opinion in Harris v. McRae was joined by Justice Marshall, summarized the
issue as follows:
[T]he Hyde Amendment is a transparent attempt by the Legislative Branch to im-
pose the political majority's judgment of the morally acceptable and socially desira-
ble preference on a sensitive and intimate decision that the Constitution entrusts to
the individual. Worse yet, the Hyde Amendment does not foist that majoritarian
viewpoint with equal measure upon everyone in our Nation, rich and poor alike;
rather, it imposes that viewpoint only upon that segment of our society which, be-
cause of its position of political powerlessness, is least able to defend its privacy rights
from the encroachments of state mandated morality. The instant legislation thus calls
for more exacting judicial review than in most other cases. 'When elected leaders
cower before public pressure, this Court, more than ever, must not shirk its duty to
enforce the Constitution for the benefit of the poor and powerless.' Beal v. Doe, 432
U.S. 438, 462 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The issue in Harris v. McRae was abortion funding. More precisely, it was Congress'
refusal to provide it after being lobbied extensively by those with identifiably religious and
moral beliefs in opposition to abortion. The 13rennan-Marshall view that judicial intervention
is needed "to enforce the Constitution for the benefit of the poor and powerless" whenever
"elected leaders cower before public pressure" is extraordinary. The "public pressure" about
which they are concerned is voter opposition to the Court's policy views on the legitimacy of
abortion. Because these justices reject the religiously motivated voter's viewpoint on this issue,
they also see religiously motivated public: pressure on the Congress to adopt it as a constitu-
tionally illegitimate basis for legislative judgment. Justice Powell's opinion in Aguilar v. Fel-
ton, makes essentially the same point in a slightly different manner in the context of aid to
religiously affiliated education:
This risk of [excessive] entanglement [between church and state] is compounded by
the additional risk of political divisiveness stemming from the aid to religion at issue
here. I do not suggest that at this point in our history the Title I program or similar
parochial aid plans could result in the establishment of a state religion. There like-
wise is small chance that these programs would result in significant religious or de-
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B. The Pastoral Letter as a Call for Political Action
When one applies these principles to the policy suggestions con-
tained in the pastoral letter, it seems clear that the bishops were not
only well within their rights as citizens to call for specific public pol-
icy responses, but were also entitled to call upon Catholic politicians
to formulate public policy positions which would clearly reflect the
legitimate legal needs of Catholic citizens for laws which protect "se-
lective" conscientious objection." Simply stated, those of draft age
nominational control over our democratic processes. [citation omitted] Nonetheless,
there remains a considerable risk of continuing political strife over the propriety of
direct aid to religious schools and the proper allocation of limited governmental re-
sources.... In states such as New York that have large and varied sectarian popula-
tions, one can be assured that politics will enter into any state decision to aid
parochial schools. . . . In short, aid to parochial schools of the sort at issue here
potentially leads to 'that kind and degree of government involvement in religious life
that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political
system to the breaking point.'" Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970)
(opinion of Harlan, J.). Although the Court's opinion does not discuss it at length,
[citation omitted] the potential for such divisiveness is a strong additional reason for
holding that the Title I and Grand Rapids programs are invalid on entanglement
grounds. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3239 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)
The "entanglement" with which Justice Powell is concerned is the involvement of voters who,
for religious reasons, have chosen to send their children to nonpublic schools. Because the
Court has taken the position that such aid is problematic, further debates over the allocation of
scarce education funds would simply open up further opportunities for "elected officials to
cower before public pressure" and reopen debates the Court had hoped were settled.
The views of Justices Blackmun and Stevens are the most direct on this point; for they
make no attempt to couch their views in a mantle of judicial concern for the integrity of the
political process. They would simply substitute the Court's moral judgment for that of the
legislature when the issue is one on which the Court has spoken. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2854 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (sodomy restrictions and the
right to privacy; Judeo-Christian tradition, standing alone, is not a legitimate source of law on
which to base restrictions of personal sexual activity); Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2187-88 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(abortion; protection of unborn as illegitimate adoption of a religious view of prenatal life);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 348 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (abortion funding; "the
Government 'punitively impresses upon a needy minority its own concepts of the socially de-
sirable, the publicly acceptable, and the morally sound' ").
77. Id. Protection of the right to object "selectively" to government policy would expand
the scope of currently available legal protection for Catholic conscientious objectors who sub-
scribe to traditional Catholic views on "just wars". As construed by the Supreme Court of the
United States, the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 Section 6(j), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j),
as amended, required that the objector plead and prove that he objects to war in general.
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). Such a construction of the statutes raises a
multitude of constitutional and statutory policy questions. See Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245
U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918); Reply Brief of Behalf of Petitioner, Negre v. Larsen, No 70-325,
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (companion case involving Catholic objector).
For discussion of other critical constitutional questions raised by the selective service cases see
generally Donnici, Governmental Encouragement of Religious Ideology: A Study of the Current
Conscientious Objection Exemption from Military Service, 13 J. PuB. L. 16 (1964); Greenawalt,
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who would respond to the bishops' call to conscience in such a man-
ner would be at legal risk.7"
Needless to say, such episcopal intervention in the political pro-
cess in pursuit of stated public policy goals rooted in identifiably doc-
trinal needs is inevitably controversial, and becomes even more so
when the goal requires the explicit cooperation of Catholic politi-
cians. 79 Notwithstanding this difficulty for Catholic politicians when
the topic is one which has traditionally been identified by the major
media as a "Catholic" issue--such as abortion or tuition tax credits,8 °
it would be difficult, under any reading of the first amendment, to
argue that active involvement by clergy in the fight for freedom of
conscience-especially where the law itself discriminates in the
protection it affords religious believers 1 -is constitutionally
inappropriate.
The pastoral letter simply reflects both the Bishops' willingness
to join in, and to influence, the political debate by stressing the moral
dimensions of political acts. That such episcopal activity might be
uncomfortable for Catholic politicians who traditionally distance
themselves from the official representatives of the teaching Church
All or Nothing at All: The Defeat of Selective Conscientious Objection, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 31;
Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the "Establishment"and "Free Exer-
cise" Clauses, 42 TEX. L. REV. 142 (1963); Rabin, When is a Religious Belief Religious: United
States v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CORN. L.Q. 231 (1966); Schwartz, No
Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968).
78. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (rejecting "selective" conscientious
objection).
79. Compare Governor Mario M. Cuomo, supra note 35, with Representative Henry J.
Hyde, supra note 35. Interestingly, it is Catholic politicians who are most affected by this
problem. President John F. Kennedy's Houston speech is a classic example of a Catholic poli-
tician forced by political forces to distance himself from his religious affinity group and its
issues. Governor Cuomo's speech is similar in political motivation, although the speaker's po-
sition on the particular issue causing the most controversy is well aligned with that of the
dominant forces in the Democratic Party in 1984. Perhaps the best example of such "singling
out," however, is the use of asterisks by the Congressional Quarterly to identify Catholic politi-
cians in reports on Congressional action on abortion related issues. See note 80,infra. One
could imagine the public outcry if such "reporting" of religious affiliation-or lack of it-
became commonplace.
80. Although these are not really "Catholic" issues, as such, they have been so identified
in the popular and other press. See, e:g., Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy Before a
Meeting of the Greater Houston Ministerial Association, September 12, 1960, cited at note 33,
supra (pledge regarding support for parochial schools); Congressional Quarterly, February 4,
1979, at 258-267 (Catholic legislators marked with an asterisk in reference to votes on abor-
tion-related issues).
81. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S.
366, 389-90 (1918); Reply Brief of Behalf of Petitioner, Negre v. Larsen, No 70-325, Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (companion case involving Catholic objector holding tradi-
tional view).
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whenever the issues are particularly sensitive to non-Catholics"' was
clearly recognized in the difference between the second and final
drafts of the letter. The Bishops explicitly account for the fact that
the moral responsibilities of politicians may sometimes be in conflict
with the tenor of the political times, but do not absolve any politician
from those responsibilities. "The difficult yet noble art of politics,"
83
simply requires that the two be resolved.
Thus, the call in the final draft for all public officials to "[be]
particularly attentive to the consciences of those who sincerely believe
that they may not support warfare in general, a given war, or the
exercise of a particular role within the armed forces," '84 and the spe-
cific admonition to Catholic politicians to support selective conscien-
tious objection which appeared in the second draft85 are perfectly
legitimate pastoral admonitions suggesting the revision of existing
public policy. Although specific directions to Catholic politicians re-
garding their own duties to "[propose] and [support] legislation
designed to give maximum protection to ...true freedom of con-
science"86 may be politically controversial, they do not present any
legal problem insofar as they are clearly within the context of pastoral
teaching.87 The Jeffersonian metaphor, "a wall of separation between
church and state,""" has been acknowledged by the United States
Supreme Court as a "useful figure of speech," but it "is not a wholly
82. See sources cited notes 35-38, supra.
83. "The Challenge of Peace" 323, quoting Pastoral Constitution #75.
84. Id. at 324.
85. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace, The
Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response (second draft), 12 ORIGINs 305, 325
(N.C. Documentary Service, Washington, D.C., October 28, 1982). The Second Draft con-
tained the following specific suggestion:
Catholic public officials might well serve all of our fellow citizens by proposing and
supporting legislation designed to give maximum protection to... true freedom of
conscience.
86. Id. Compare The Challenge of Peace 324 (admonition to public officials generally).
87. Pastoral teaching should not be understood, however, to include the official support of
particular candidates or particular pieces of legislation by the church as an institution. Such
activities, while constitutionally protected, may result in a proportionate or total loss of tax
exemptions available to religious and charitable institutions under federal and state tax laws.
See, e.g., Internal Revenue Code §§ 501(c)(3), 511; N.Y. Real Property Tax Law § 421, N.Y.
Tax Law §§ 601(d), 1116; art. 9A. A detailed discussion of the statutory and public policy
implications of the tax exemption issue is beyond the scope of this paper. For general discus-
sion of these issues, see Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (public
policy and tax exemptions); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, (1970) (constitutionality of
tax exemptions); Christian Echoes National Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. den., 414 U.S. 864 (1973). See also, Caron and Dessingue, .R C. § 501(c)(3 :
Practical and Constitutional Implications of "Political" Activity Restrictions, 2 J. LAW & REL.
169 (1985).
88. See notes 18-20, supra.
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accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in
fact exists between church and state." The "wall" is, in fact, only a
"blurred, indistinct and variable barrier depending on all the circum-
stances of a particular relationship"8 9 which should neither restrain
church leaders, politicians or believing citizens from suggesting solu-
tions based on church teaching, nor reduce the nation's Bishops to the
ubiquitous political device of calling for a committee to study nuclear
disarmament.90 All who are concerned with the potential for nuclear
destruction-regardless of their particular suggestions for preventing
it-should heed the admonition of Professor Alexander Meikeljohn
regarding the value of speech on issues of great controversy:
The First Amendment [does] not require that, on every occa-
sion, every citizen shall take part in public debate. Nor can it even
give assurance that everyone shall have opportunity to do so.
[What] is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that every-
thing worth saying shall be said. . . . And this means that though
citizens may, on other grounds, be barred from speaking, they may
not be barred because their views are thought to be false or danger-
ous. [No] speaker may be declared 'out of order' because we disa-
gree with what he intends to [say].
Conflicting views may be expressed, must be expressed, not
because they are valid, but because they are relevant. If they are
responsibly entertained by anyone, we, the voters need to hear
them. [To] be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to be unfit for self-gov-
ernment. Any such suppression of ideas about the common good,
the First Amendment condemns with its absolute disapproval.91
By calling for active public dialogue over nuclear war and peace,
the Bishops and those who debate the merits of their suggestions will
be following in the time-honored American tradition of free and open
discussion of important controversial ideas. Given the necessity for
free and open debate on issues of public importance, even the archi-
tect of the metaphorical "wall of separation between church and
state" would find it difficult to question either the bishops' right to get
the debate over the moral aspects started, or the right of the citizenry
and its representatives to act upon the principles identified in the
89. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
614 (1971).
90. See The Challenge of Peace 324.
91. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government, reprinted in part in
LOCKHART, KAMISAR, CHOPER & SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 684-86 (6th ed. West
1986).
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process.
92
III. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND THE WORKER
IN DEFENSE INDUSTRIES
Perhaps the most difficult area in which to predict the legal im-
pact of the pastoral letter on individuals is the situation of the worker
in defense industries engaged in the production of weapons of mass
destruction. For politicians and the citizenry at large, the analysis is
largely one which focuses on the relationship of freedom of speech
and exercise of religion to debates which, because of either the subject
matter or the participants, appear to occur in the zone where religion
and generalized public policy concerns intersect. For military person-
nel, the analysis is confined by the limits, both practical and legal, that
a tightly structured and focused military command must impose on
its members.93 In the case of the worker in a defense industry, how-
ever, the analysis is complicated by the civilian status of the employee,
the need of the contractor for reliable workers, inherent limitations on
the reach of constitutional rights,94 and express provisions which limit
the duty of employers to accommodate employee religious practices
which exist in many employment discrimination laws.93
In order to obtain a clear picture of the status of the worker in a
defense industry, it will be helpful to start with the relevant text of the
pastoral letter itself:
92. See Little, Thomas Jefferson's Religious Views and Their Influence on the Supreme
Court's Interpretation of the First Amendment, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 57 (1976).
93. It is well settled that the needs of the military services command substantial deference
in the analysis of constitutional claims which will have an impact on either military action or
discipline. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348
(1980) (upholding Air Force regulation requiring authorization "from the appropriate com-
mander" before signatures could be collected on a petition); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828
(1976) (upholding regulations banning demonstrations, picketing, protest marches, political
speeches or similar activities on the post, and prohibiting the posting of any publication with-
out prior written approval of post headquarters); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (uphold-
ing conviction of Army officer for urging soldiers to disobey orders to go to Vietnam under
Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for "conduct unbecoming an
officer and gentleman" and "prejudicial to good order and discipline"); Schlesinger v. Reserv-
ists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (standing; judicial refusal to intervene in
war powers controversy); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Japanese exclu-
sion cases). See also Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
94. Substantive constitutional rights which find their source in either the Bill of Rights or
the fourteenth amendment are limitations on the powers of government. In order to hold a
private party as being involved in "state action" a nexus must be shown between government
and the private action. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. (1974); Moose Lodge v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
95. See text at notes 105, 120-122, infra.
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To Men and Women in Defense Industries: You also face specific
questions, because the defense industry is directly involved in the
development and production of the weapons of mass destruction
which have concerned us in this letter. We do not presume or pre-
tend that clear answers exist to many of the personal, professional
and financial choices facing you in your varying responsibilities. In
this letter we have ruled out certain uses of nuclear weapons, while
also expressing conditional moral acceptance for deterrence. All
Catholics, at every level of' defense industries, can and should use
the moral principles of this letter to form their consciences. We
realize that different judgments of conscience will face different
people, and we recognized the possibility of diverse concrete judg-
ments being made in this complex area. We seek as moral teachers
and pastors to be available to all who confront these questions of
personal and vocational choice. Those who in conscience decide
that they should no longer be associated with defense activities
should find support in the: Catholic community. Those who re-
main in these industries or earn a profit from the weapons industry
should find in the Church guidance and support for the ongoing
evaluation of their work.9 6
From an examination of the final recommendations in the text, it
is possible to glean several key points, which may be summarized as
follows:
1. Physical or economic participation in the production of
nuclear weapons raises, for each individual, the same moral ques-
tions which have been raised in the letter as a whole;
2. The teachings of the pastoral letter are a guide for
Catholics involved in defense industries, and should be used in the
formation of a position of conscience on continued participation
(to whatever degree) in the industry;
3. Diverse judgments of conscience are possible, for there
are no clear answers to many of the concrete questions which will
face the defense worker; and
4. The Church will p'rovide guidance and support, whatever
decision is made.
Each of these points is critical to an examination of the legal rights
and obligations of defense workers who elect to take a position of
conscience which is based on the teachings of the letter and is at odds
with the requirements of their employer.
96. The Challenge of Peace, 318.
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A. Formulation of the Conscientious Position:
A Legal Requirement
In any analysis of the rights of the religious dissenter, it is imper-
ative to begin with that which is most basic: the nature and sources of
the conscientious objection. For a Catholic or adherent of another
religion who seeks to utilize the letter in defense of a position of con-
science, it is important, for legal purposes, that the pastoral letter be
seen as the teaching tool the bishops designed it to be-as a guide to
the formulation of conscience which contains both "universally bind-
ing moral principles found in the teaching of the Church" and "rec-
ommendations which allow for diversity of opinion of the part of
those who assess the factual data."97 Because it is not, by its own
admission, a definitive statement of binding moral norms, but rather
an invitation for extended discussion and reflection on the morality of
nuclear war,98 the person intending to rely on the text of the letter,
without more, to defend himself or herself against foreseeable em-
ployer reactions, would be well advised to reconsider reliance on the
text alone;99 for the letter itself makes no meaningful distinction be-
tween the official responsibilities of government officials, and the dis-
crete obligations of individuals who are searching for the place to
draw the line in their own lives and careers.1°°
What the letter appears to call for,"0 ' and what the law de-
mands, 10 2 is a clear statement of personal moral principle on the part
of each individual who wishes to take advantage of the limited free-
dom of action protected by both the first amendment 0 3 and employ-
ment discrimination law."° It is only when the individual has formed
a conscientious position-and disclosed it-that the protections of the
law, to whatever extent they are applicable, come into play. The in-
herent limitations of the letter itself and their impact on the average
Catholic are discussed in the concluding sections of this paper.
97. The Challenge of Peace, Summary 1 3.
98. The Challenge of Peace, $t 4, 10.
99. See text at notes 133-153, infra (reference to employment discrimination cases).
100. The Challenge of Peace, 11 66, 70, 75-111.
101. See The Challenge of Peace, 318.
102. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
103. See text at notes 25-26, supra.
104. See text at notes 119-122, infra.
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B. Conscientious Objection and Employment Discrimination
Law: °5 Allocating the Burdens of Conscience
Because the pastoral letter calls upon men and women in defense
industries to "confront . . . questions of personal and vocational
choice"'0 6 which will ineviitably involve either a decision to "no
longer be associated with defense activities"'0 7 or to "remain in these
industries or earn a profit from the weapons industry,"'0 8 it is critical
that the risks and burdens 'which come with such decisions be ana-
lyzed. The Bishops pledge their availability "as moral teachers and
pastors,"' 0 9 but what about the practical legal risks attendant upon
the making of a moral choice to resign, transfer, or continue employ-
ment with explicit reservations concerning the types of acceptable as-
signments? Surprisingly, these questions were not considered by the
Bishops in the investigative process which led to the publication of the
letter, 1"0 even though the answers to many of them will determine the
level and type of "support" the Catholic community should be ex-
pected to provide those whose actions have legal consequences such as
job loss. I'I
The primary focus of this section of the paper, therefore, will be
the operation of the religious discrimination sections of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964," 2 and the degree to which they may be
used to defend the conscientious choices of those who work in the
defense industry against discrimination by employers. Also to be con-
105. The materials in this section deal only with the requirements of the main federal
employment discrimination law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e,
et seq. The requirements of applicable state fair employment practices laws and the application
of those statutes to federal defense contractors is beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g.,
ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-1463 (B)(1) (1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 378-2 (1976);
MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. 5 § 4572 (1964); NEBRASKA REV. STAT. § 48-1104 (1943); PA.
STAT. ANN. Tit. 43 § 955(5)(g) (Purdon 1963); 4B UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-6 (1953). For a
discussion of the application of those statutes to religiously affiliated colleges and universities
see F.N. DUTILE AND E.M. GAFFNEY, STATE AND CAMPUS (1984).




110. There is no indication in either the text of the Letter and its drafts or the news cover-
age which followed its publication, that the issue was given any consideration. The only rele-
vant portions of the letter which could be said to address this issue were the references to the
Statement on Registration and Conscription for Military Service (Washington, D.C 1980) and
Human Life in Our Day (Washington, D.C. 1980), but examination of the footnote material
referenced in the text of the letter indicates that they are not on point, especially with respect
to the obligation of civilians in the nonmilitary context.
11. The Challenge of Peace 318..
112. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, §§ 701(j), 702, and 703(a-e), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-l, 2000e- 2(a-e).
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sidered will be the level of constitutional protection afforded workers
who quit or are fired from their jobs for reasons of conscience. While
Title VII governs the employer/employee relationship,' 13 eligibility
for unemployment benefits turns on the construction of state law,
114
which has been held to be subject to the constitutional restraints of
the Free Exercise Clause. 11
5
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Narrow Protection for Religious
Belief and Practice
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin. 1 6 For purposes of the statute, the term "religion" is defined as
follows:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or
prospective employee's religious observance or practice without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.117
Title VII thus defines and prohibits two distinct forms of employment
discrimination based on religious factors:
1) that which is based on the identity or type of religious
belief held or practiced by the employee (representation); 118 and
2) failure to accommodate religious practices where it is pos-
sible to do so without "undue hardship" to the employer's business
(accommodation). 119
There are three related, but distinct, exceptions to the general
prohibitions, but only one of them is relevant to workers in defense
113. Section 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) extends Title VII coverage to any
"employer... engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees
.. . and any agent of such person, but such term does not include (1) the United States, a
corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or any
department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the com-
petitive service (as defined by section 2101 of Title 5 of the United States Code) .... " Title VII
was amended in 1972 to include federal employees, P.L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 111, as amended 92
Stat. 3781 (1978) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 105 (1974).
114. See generally, eg., OHIO REV. CODE § 4141.09. etseq. 29 (Page, 1984); 15 TEX. CIv.
STATS. §§ 522 lb-1 et seq. (Vernon supp. 1983).
115. Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707
(1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
116. Section 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
117. Section 7010); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(j), as amended.
118. See note 143, infra.
119. See note 122, infra. Cases arising in this category are, by far, the most common for
reasons discussed in note 140.
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industries. 121 In relevant part, it provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of [Title VIII, (1) it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees, . . . on the basis of his religion,. . . in those
certain instances where religion.... is a bona fide occupational qual-
ification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that par-
ticular business or enterprise....
Taken as a whole, therefore, Title VII imposes upon employers a
duty of non-discrimination on the basis of religion except where 1) the
"normal operation" of the particular business or enterprise "reason-
ably" requires differential treatment, and; 2) where accommodation
will result in an "undue hardship" on the employer's business.
122
120. The other two sections, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 and 2000e- 2(e)(2), relate to the need for
religious institutions and their affiliated educational institutions, to hire on the basis of religion
whenever their activities reasonably require it. As such, these sections explicitly recognize that,
for religious institutions, religious belief is often a "bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e)(l) [BFOQ]. The effect of these provisions is to remove a considerable, and proba-
bly unconstitutional, amount of discretion from the courts or administrative agencies which
would, in the absence of such special rules, be asked to make determinations concerning the
legitimacy of hiring practices designed to safeguard the doctrinal integrity and mission of reli-
gious institutions. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (religion as a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion) with, e.g., EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir.
1981) (reporting requirements of Title VII),; McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th
Cir. 1972) (sex-discrimination, church-minister relationship).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-2(e).
122. It is significant that the statute is phrased in this manner, for it negates the applicabil-
ity of the nondiscrimination provisions upon the showing of "reasonable" necessity. It has
been held that, for purposes of religious discrimination, all that need be shown by the employer
to claim the exemption is a de minimis impact on business or labor contract interests. See
T.W.A. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (accommodation); Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission, Religious Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1) (defining
"undue hardship"). The reasons for such a narrow construction of the statute are varied, and
relate to both constitutional and statutory concerns.
In Hardison, for example, it was significant that the union involved claimed its duty to
accommodate (based on Section 703 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)) was negated by the
impact of the requested accommodation (a shift change) on the seniority system, see 432 U.S.
at 81-83 (relying on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)). At this writing, the relationship of general
nondiscrimination requirements and the requirements of bona-fide seniority systems is far
from settled, especially where it is argued that the Constitution itself (rather than Title VII) is
the source of the nondiscrimination rule. Compare, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576
(1984) (race discrimination; Title VII); Franks v. Bowman Transportation, Co, 424 U.S. 747,
778 (1976) (race discrimination; retroactive seniority), with Local No. 93, International Assn.
of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986) (race discrimi-
nation; Title VII); N.A.A.C.P. v Detroit Police Officer's Ass'n., 591 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D.
Mich. 1984). Such a discussion is far beyond the scope of this paper and the subject is men-
tioned only to illustrate the difference in approach between representation cases involving race,
sex or national origin discrimination, and. accommodation cases involving religious discrimina-
tion as defined by Section 7010) of Title VII.
In the former, a considerable burden on employer business practice is held to be justifiable
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Given this background, the application of these rules to the con-
scientiously objecting worker in a defense-related industry can now be
examined. Once again, the first reference is to the pastoral letter. Be-
cause the letter offers no concrete guidance to the individual who will
not be involved with those activities which are deemed to be clearly
immoral, such as targeting civilian populations, 123 a considerable
amount of discretion has been vested in individual Catholics to form
their own consciences on issues of nuclear war and peace.124 Tradi-
tional Catholic doctrine distinguishes between "just" and "unjust"
wars (ius ad bellum), and between means of waging war which are
legitimate and illegitimate (ius in bello).125 This method of analysis
presupposes that some wars are just and that some means of waging
war are legitimate. Positions which go beyond those teachings to gen-
eralized objection to all war or to any use of nuclear weaponry would
be difficult to characterize as being based in what is commonly under-
stood to be "traditional" Catholic teaching. The bishops appear to
make this clear when they stated that while "[they had] ruled out
certain uses of nuclear weapons, [they had] ... also express[ed] condi-
tional moral acceptance for deterrence" '126 [i.e. other uses]. Since
in order to eradicate discrimination, in the latter cases, only a slight burden is held to be
permissible. Compare T.W.A. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) with Williams v. Southern
Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512
(6th Cir. 1975), cert. den., 429 U.S. 964; Johnson v. United States Postal Service, 497 F.2d 128
(5th Cir. 1974) (finding undue burden on other employees); Draper v. United States Pipe &
Foundry, Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 576 F.2d 544 (6th
Cir., 1975), aff'd by equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976); Riley v. Bendix Corp, 464 F.2d
1113 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding no undue burden and duty to accommodate). Although part of
the distinction may be based on statutory language, not all of it can be explained on this basis.
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining "on the basis of sex" to include needed accommoda-
tion for pregnancy related conditions).
Another reason, rarely discussed in detail, relates to the duty of Congress under the Reli-
gion Clauses of the first amendment to avoid preferences for any one religion over another. On
this topic, see generally Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Cummins v.
Parker Seal Co., supra, 516 F.2d at 556 (Celebrezze, J. dissenting) (arguing that the religious
accommodation requirements of Title VII are unconstitutional as a preference for and among
religions). Note, The Constitutionality of an Employer's Duty to Accommodate Religious Be-
liefs and Practices, 56 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 635 (1980); Note, The Reasonable Accommodation
Rule Mandates Unconstitutional Preference for Religious Workers in Title VII Actions, 30
VAND. L. REV. 1059 (1977).
123. The Challenge of Peace, 147-49.
124. See text at note 96, supra.
125. The Challenge of Peace 80-111. For a thorough discussion of the range of religious
traditions which also adopt this position see PEACE IN A NUCLEAR AGE: THE BISHOPS' PAS-
TORAL LETTER IN PERSPECTIVE (C. Reid ed. 1986). See also R. BAINTON, CHRISTIAN ATI-
TUDES TOWARD WAR AND PEACE: A HISTORICAL SURVEY AND CRITICAL REEVALUATION
(1960); C. CURRAN, DIRECTIONS IN CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHICS (1984); G. ZAHN, WAR,
CONSCIENCE AND DISSENT (1967).
126. The Challenge of Peace 318.
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"different judgments of conscience will face different people" who can
and should make "diverse concrete judgments" on these questions, all
such individuals are entitled to support from both the clergy and the
Catholic community at large as long as they form their respective
consciences in a manner arguably consistent with the language of the
pastoral letter. 1" Given such flexibility of approach, the bishops' con-
cern that the law protect "true" [i.e. selective]1 28 freedom of con-
science is well-founded. Traditional Catholic positions concerning
selective conscientious objection have never been accepted by the
courts in the military context,"1 9 and it would be devastating for
Catholics as workers to face the same insensitivity to their conscien-
tious needs. More importantly, however, the Bishops' admission that
individual Catholics may find it difficult to determine precisely how
the letter applies to their own situations as workers in defense-related
industries would make it nearly impossible for an individual Catholic
to rely on the pastoral letter alone 30 to resolve questions of con-
science which might have an impact on the "personal, professional
and financial choices facing [them] in [their] varying
responsibilities". 
1 31
For purposes of Title VI [, however, the law makes it clear that
providing legal protection for conscientious objection claims, even
those supported by positions 'which are not identified with the exact
teachings of a given religion, is legitimate, and may be constitutionally
required.'3 2 The "Religious Discrimination Guidelines" 133 published
127. Id. This is especially true given the discussion of the value of nonviolence in Ill-
21.
128. The Challenge of Peace 324.
129. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), see generally sources cited at notes 77,
78, 81, supra.
130. The Challenge of Peace 318 makes it clear that the Bishops "seek as moral teachers
and pastors to be available to all who confront these questions of personal and vocational
choice[, and that] ... [t]hose who remain in [defense] industries or earn a profit from the
weapons industry should find in the Church guidance and support for the ongoing evaluation of
their work." (emphasis supplied). From this it can be seen that the letter alone will not be
sufficient to supply necessary answers. Reference to additional sources, in conjunction with the
pastoral guidance the Bishops have pledged, is necessary.
131. Id.
132. See Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S.
707 (1981); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965). But see, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985)
Although Thomas, Welsh and Seeger were cases decided outside the scope of Title VII, they do
form a legitimate basis for administrative determination of the applicable law. Of these three
cases, only Thomas presented an actual constitutional claim. Although both Welsh and Seeger
turned on determinations of Congressional intent when it enacted the Military Selective Ser-
vice Act, the Supreme Court made it very clear that a contrary result in either case would have
raised serious constitutional questions. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971);
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by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(E.E.O.C.) state that "the Commission will define [the statutory term]
'religious practices' to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is
right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of tradi-
tional religious views."' 134  Thus, a defense worker need only show
that the position of conscience taken on the basis of the teachings
contained in the pastoral letter is sincerely held "with the strength of
traditional religious views." It makes no difference whether the teach-
ings are "identifiably" those of the faith to which the worker
subscribes.
The fact that no religious group espouses such beliefs or the
fact that the religious groups to which the individual professes to
belong may not accept such belief will not determine whether the
belief is a religious belief of the employee or prospective
employee. 135
Notwithstanding the apparent breadth of Title VII coverage in
such instances, the critical factor is not the belief or practice of the
employee, but the degree of hardship accommodation which that be-
lief will impose on the employer. 136 Because an employer may legiti-
mately refuse to make anything more than a de minimis effort, 1
37
especially where it would involve dislocation of other employees,1
3 8
the potential obstacles to accommodation of the conscientious objec-
tor's rights within the workplace will depend on whether the nature of
the employer's business and labor contracts, if any, will limit or elimi-
nate the dissenting employee's job flexibility.
An employer's duty to attempt accommodation arises at the
point where an employee fulfills his or her preliminary obligation to
disclose the religious need. 139 From this, it follows that an employer
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965);
Reply Brief of Behalf of Petitioner, Negre v. Larsen, No 70-325, Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437 (1971) (companion case involving Catholic objector).
133. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Religious Discrimination Guidelines,
29 C.F.R. § 1605. 1, et seq.; CCH Employment Practices Guide T 3970.01 et seq.
134. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1.
135. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1.
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(e)(l).
137. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c). T.W.A. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). See also text at note 122, supra.
139. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c) provides, in relevant part:
(1) After an employee or prospective employee notifies the employer or labor or-
ganization of his or her need for a religious accommodation, the employer or labor
organization has an obligation to reasonably accommodate the individual's religious
practices. A refusal to accommodate is justified only when an employer or labor
organization can demonstrate than an undue hardship would in fact result from each
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has the right to assume that there are no religious objections to the
type of work or duties assigned, religious or otherwise, unless they are
voiced by the employee. Likewise, an employer may not make blan-
ket assumptions during the hiring or promotion process concerning
adherents of a given religion.-here Catholics-without first ascertain-
ing that the individual involved would be unable or unwilling to do
the job. Title VII law does not favor broad class-based assumptions
about job qualifications. 40  For that reason a defense industry em-
ployer who elects to avoid the burden of accommodation by simply
refusing to hire or promote Catholics would be guilty of a prima facie
violation of the statute141 unless it could be proved that the particular
individual involved was unqualified, 42 or that hiring only non-
Catholics was "reasonably necessary" to the conduct of the em-
ployer's business.
143
available alternative method of accommodation. A mere assumption that many
more people, with the same religious practices as the person being accommodated,
may also need accommodation is not evidence of undue hardship.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. Cf 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (by negative implication). City of Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
141. See generally, B.L. Schlei and P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law (B.N.A.
1976).
142. Id.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (BFOQ). Such a showing would be impossible under these
facts, and the author has found no cases where this section has been found to apply. The law
simply does not permit such "broad brush" classification, see, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep't
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (sex-based pension annuity tables), and
provides special protection in those few cases where scrutiny of religious belief by an employer
is clearly proper. See E.E.O.C. v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277
(5th Cir. 1981) (reporting requirements of Title VII). Compare, 42 U.S.C. (2000e-2(e)(1)
(BFOQ) and Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (standards for BFOQ),
with 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (forbidding discrimination against those opposing abortion by em-
ployers and training programs receiving financial assistance from the Public Health Service).
The E.E.O.C. Guidelines do not even permit employers to inquire concerning religious beliefs
for statistical purposes. See Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 396, 398 (5th Cir. 1979) (De-
fendant denies during discovery that it kept records reflecting religious and sexual preferences
of employees); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. United States Fidelity and Guar-
anty Co., 14 E.P.D. 7528 (D. Md. 1977). See also United States Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7 (adopting E.E.O.C. categories). In addition, some
states expressly prohibit the gathering of such data, e.g., ADMIN. CODE OF CITY OF N.Y. § B1-
7.0(1) (d) and (l-a)(d); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(d) and (1-a)(d) (McKinney's 1972) (prohibi-
tion of discrimination on the basis of "'creed"); Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38 (1954); Cf.,
State Div. of Human Rights v. Gorton, 32 A.D. 2d 933, 302 N.Y.S. 2d 966 (2nd Dep't. 1969)
(discrimination found on the basis of employer's repeated inquiries and constant harassment as
to respondent's religion). Given the importance of workplace demographics for most Title VII
enforcement cases involving representation, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973); Burns v. Thiokol Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. den., 404 U.S. 984 (1971), such
limitations force individuals to prove an intentional rather than a statistical case. See generally
B.L. Schlei & P. Grossman, supra, at 1161-1195. Even though it is well settled that statistical
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The difficulty, if any, will arise when the defense employer learns
of the employee or potential employee's objections. Assuming that the
employee and employer can locate an available"4 job within the em-
ployer's work force which does not compromise the employee's con-
science, there is no guarantee that the employer will be either willing
or able to accommodate the request. Simple unwillingness, of course,
is not enough,145 but any legitimate business reason will suffice as long
as it is not a pretext for discriminatory conduct.146 Thus, it has been
held that disruption of the work force, adverse impact on morale, and
simple unavailability of a suitable job are sufficient reasons. 147 When
the issue is hiring or promotion, rather than accommodation, and the
job or promotion would bring the candidate closer to levels of respon-
sibility which might involve the actual planning or implementation of
acts deemed by the letter to be immoral, both the employee and the
employer may have legitimate reasons to discuss the situation in order
proof is relevant to the prima facie case in a Title VII action, the lack of statistics makes the
already difficult task of proving intentional religious discrimination nearly impossible. The
E.E.O.C. Guidelines currently require that employee demographics be kept only in the follow-
ing classifications "White," "Black," "Hispanic," "Asian or Pacific Islander," or "American
Indian or Alaskan Native," see 29 C.F.R. § 1602.20. The Guidelines do not carry the force of
law and are, therefore, not binding on employers or judges. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
has indicated that they are to be given "great deference." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 433-434 (1971). A discussion on this point is beyond the scope of this article and is noted
only to point out the difficulty this lack of data creates in dealing with questions of religious
and national origin discrimination generally. See, e.g., Sklenar v. Detroit Bd. of Education,
497 F. Supp. 1154 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
144. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j)(burden); 2000e-2(h) (seniority). See T.W.A. v. Hardison, note
137, supra.
145. See Minkus v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chicago, 600 F.2d 80 (7th Cir.
1979); Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172 (1979) (employer refusal to accommodate).
146. See B.L. Schlei & P. Grossman, supra note 141, at 1195-96 and sources cited. Accord
Oates v. United States Postal Service, 458 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd without opinion,
591 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1978); Levine v. Navapache Hospital, 26 E.P.D. 32, 103 (D. Ariz.
1981) (anti-Semitic remark insufficient to prove religious discrimination where employee was
insubordinate and disruptive; religious discrimination charge would not affect discharge for
valid cause). The degree to which the courts have not settled on an approach to religious
discrimination cases is illustrated by Hershinow v. Bonamarte, 735 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1984), a
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Hershinow, a Jewish policeman unsuccess-
fully challenged his suspension from the police for "unprofessional conduct" during an inci-
dent where a driver stopped for a traffic violation made a series of anti-Semitic remarks about
Jewish women generally. When Officer Hershinow told the driver that he was Jewish, she
threatened "to get [his] Jewish wife." The alleged "unprofessional conduct" was the officer's
attempt to arrest the driver for making such a threat, and his dropping the matter after the
driver apologized.
147. See e.g., Palmer v. Bd. of Education of City of Chicago, 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979),
aff'g, 466 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (refusal to take part in essential activities); Howard v.
Haverty Furniture Companies, Inc., 615 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1980); Jordan v. North Carolina
National Bank, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977).
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to avoid serious future problems. 148
C. Conscientious Objection and the Impact of Voluntary or
Involuntary Separation from Employment on Eligibility
for Unemployment Benefits
In cases where an employee quits or is fired from a job because
the employer cannot accommodate the employee's religious needs,
there may be a period where the former employee seeks unemploy-
ment compensation pursuant to the laws of the state in which he re-
sides. In such cases, the immediate legal question will be whether the
individual is eligible for unemployment compensation. This, in turn,
will depend upon the particular provisions of the state statute under
which application is made. In cases where an employee quits, or is
fired for legitimate reason, many states deny unemployment compen-
sation, 149 but in a series of cases which commenced with Sherbert v.
Verner "I the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the
Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment imposes important limits
on this discretion. It is now virtually impossible for the states to treat
religiously based conscientious objection to continued employment as
a valid reason for denial of unemployment compensation benefits.
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct :mandated by religious belief, thereby
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior
and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is
nonetheless substantial.1
51
148. According to the dual commands of both the law and the pastoral letter, the Catholic
employee's obligation in such a situation would be both legal and moral. The moral obligation
would be to use the teachings of the pastoral letter to analyze the new job responsibilities and
integrate them into one's conscience. See The Challenge of Peace 318. The legal obligation
would be to disclose any decision adverse to the employer's interests in order to invoke the
protections of Title VII. E.E.O.C. Religious discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1, et
seq. See Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. den., 434 U.S. 1039
(1978). Such disclosure might also be required in the course of qualification for necessary
security clearances. See 32 C.F.R. § 156.3. It should be obvious at this point that the em-
ployer's obligations are minimal, and that the courts are unlikely to impose any obligation
which would interfere with routine operations. See cases cited at notes 122, 146, supra. It
should also be noted that interference with defense-related operations might be a criminal
offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 2156.
149. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code § 4141.29.
150. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
151. Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707,
718-19 (1981).
[Vol. 4
PASTORAL POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
The most recent of the unemployment cases is Thomas v. Review
Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division,52 a case which is
particularly relevant to the subject matter of this article.'53 Thomas
involved the refusal of an employee to transfer from a job in a defunct
roll foundry which had been turning out sheet steel for a variety of
industrial uses to another of his employer's divisions which fabricated
military tank turrets. When Thomas found that his new job was re-
lated to the manufacture of military equipment, he checked for other
available plant openings and found that all of the remaining depart-
ments of his employer were engaged in the manufacture of weapons.
Since transfer would not solve his problem, he asked for a layoff,
which would make him eligible for unemployment benefits under In-
diana law," 4 but his employer refused. So he quit, asserting that he
could not work on weapons without violating the principles of his
religion.' 55 When his unemployment claim was heard in the Indiana
Employment Security Division, it was rejected on the ground that the
termination of Thomas' employment was not based upon a "good
cause [arising] in connection with [his] work" as required by the Indi-
ana unemployment compensation statute. 5 6 On appeal, the Indiana
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Review Board, holding that
"good cause which justifies involuntary unemployment must be job-
related and objective in character."'5 7 In addition, it held that the
basis and the precise nature of Thomas' views concerning his obliga-
tions as a Jehovah's Witness were unclear, apparently because
Thomas' views were stricter than those of another Jehovah's Witness
who had testified at the hearing, and that they amounted more to a
"personal philosophical choice" than a religious belief which was enti-
tled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause of the first amend-
ment. ' 8 Nonetheless, it concluded its opinion by holding that even if
Thomas had quit for religious reasons, he would not be entitled to
152. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
153. The Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear two additional cases involving reli-
gious discrimination in employment and benefits. Philbrook v. Ansonia Board of Education,
757 F.2d 476, 37 F.E.P. Cases 404 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 848 (No. 85-495)
(religious discrimination under Title VII); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of
Florida, - So. 2d - (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985),juris. postponed to hearing on the merits,
55 U.S.L.W. 3058 (No. 85-993).
154. Indiana Code § 22-4-15-1 (1976 and Supp. 1978).
155. 450 U.S. at 708.
156. Id.
157. 450 U.S. at 712-13, quoting Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment
Security Division, 271 Ind. 233, 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1129 (1981).
158. Id., 450 U.S. 707, at 708, 391 N.E.2d at 1131.
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benefits under Indiana law because termination motivated by religion
did not amount to "good cause" objectively related to the work.159
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that a state court
is not permitted to burden the employee's first amendment rights by
conditioning the receipt of benefits on the rejection of sincerely held
personal religious beliefs.16 ° In this regard, the Court did nothing
more than to reaffirm the general rule of Sherbert v. Verner, 6' but the
case is also significant insofar as it extended the general rule against
judicial inquiry into the validity or consistency of an individual's be-
lief system'62 to the case where an individual is applying for govern-
ment benefits. 63  The Court's words are significant given the
159. Id.
160. Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707,
715.
161. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
162. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
163. The extension of such reasoning to the provision of governmental benefits places the
Supreme Court in an interesting constitutional quandary which it has yet to resolve. Its deci-
sions under the Establishment Clause indicate that the first amendment "bespeaks a govern-
ment.., stripped of all power ... to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions. . .' and
no State 'can pass laws which aid one religion ... [or] all religions.' "Thomas v. Review Board
of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, at 725 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(quoting Everson v. Board of Educatiort, 330 U.S. 1(1947). A long line of cases has invalidated
government financial subsidies or support for religious activity, see, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Ball v. School District of Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. -
(1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Commit-
tee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), and the battle over this
issue is far from over. See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,
106 S. Ct. 748 (1986), rev'g, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 689 P.2d 53 (1984); Goldman v. Weinberger,
106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986), aff'g, 236 U.S. App. D.C. 248, 734 F.2d. 1531 (1985); Bowen v. Roy,
106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986), rev'g and remanding, Roy v. Cohn, 590 F. Supp. 600 (M.D. Pa. 1984);
Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986), vacating and remanding
741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
In Thomas, by contrast, the Court ruled that to deny otherwise available governmental
benefits on the grounds that "[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct
mandated by religious belief, [it] thereby put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify
his behavior and to violate his beliefs." In the Court's view, such pressure constitutes a sub-
stantial and impermissible "burden upon religion" under the Free Exercise Clause of the first
amendment. 450 U.S. 707, at 717-18 (majority opinion).
The difficulty with this argument is that most of the Court's holdings under the Establish-
ment Clause involve its own attempts to condition otherwise available public assistance on an
individual's willingness to give up the constitutionally protected right to choose to be educated
in a religiously affiliated or private school rather than a public school. Compare Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (recogniz-
ing this right), with e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, supra; Ball v. School District of Grand Rapids,
supra; Thomas v. Allegany County Board of Education, 51 Md. App. 312, 443 A.2d 622
(1982). But cf, Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 106 S. Ct. 748
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differences in opinion which have already arisen concerning the re-
quirements of the pastoral letter.
Intrafaith differences.., are not uncommon among followers of a
particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill equipped
to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses....
Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judicial func-
tion and judicial competence to inquire whether the [individual]
or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of
their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation. 1 64
Because the states will not be free to question the interpretation
of Catholic doctrine accepted by a worker who quits or is fired from a
defense-related job, it is irrelevant that the teachings of the pastoral
letter may not be clear as they apply to individuals who work in de-
fense industries. Even though "different judgments of conscience will
face different people, and . . . diverse concrete judgments [may be]
made in this complex area[,]J"1 65 the Church makes it clear that it will
"be available to all who confront these questions of personal and vo-
cational choice[,]" and will support those who "in conscience decide
(1986), rev'g, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 689 P.2d 53 (1984) (individual choice to allocate otherwise
available educational benefits to religious education program does not violate the Establish-
ment Clause); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (child benefit theory); Everson v. Board of
Education, supra (same). This fact was not lost in Justice Rehnquist's pointed dissent in
Thomas, 450 U.S. 707, at 724, 727:
This decision today illustrates how far astray the Court has gone in interpreting the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. Although the
Court holds that a State is constitutionally required to provide direct financial assist-
ance to persons solely on the basis of their religious beliefs and recognizes the 'ten-
sion between the two Clauses, it does little to help resolve that tension or to offer
meaningful guidance to other courts which must decide cases like this on a day-to-
day basis.' 450 U.S. 707 at 722.
Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist would not have protected Thomas by extending the Free Exer-
cise Clause to cover his case, but rather would have supplanted the Sherbert rule with that of
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). Such a development in the law of Free Exercise
would lead to a contrary result in much of the foregoing analysis. See also Goldman v. Wein-
berger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986); Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
One development worthy of note in this regard is the Court's decision in Estate of Thorn-
ton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), which appears to signal a shift in the Court's thinking
in matters of Free Exercise. A thorough analysis of Caldor, which invalidated, on Establish-
ment Clause grounds, a Connecticut state labor law which required accommodation of an
employee's designated Sabbath-is beyond the scope of this essay. Since the case rests on Es-
tablishment Clause analysis, rather than a Free Exercise rationale, Justice Rehnquist's view of
the reach of the Free Exercise Clause has gained little, if any, support within a Court which
seems far more preoccupied with marking the proper boundaries of religious accommodation
under the Establishment Clause than making sense of the religious freedom guarantee implicit
in the first amendment as a whole.
164. Id., 450 U.S. at 716 (majority opinion).
165. The Challenge of Peace 318.
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that they should no longer be associated with defense activities
... )166 It is therefore likely that unemployment benefits will be
available as at least one source of the "support" for the conscientious
objector which will be available in the community at large.
167
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of the foregoing summary of the law has been to
address some of the major constitutional and legal questions which
arise in light of the Bishops' pastoral letter on war and peace.
Although no attempt has been made to address these questions ex-
haustively, it does seem clear that the Bishops were well within their
rights to sound a moral alarm over the issue of nuclear weapons, and
that individuals who elect to respond to their suggestions can find
some support for their individual decisions of conscience in the law.
Whether the Bishops' teachings were justified on moral, politicil,
strategic or other grounds are topics which have been addressed else-
where. 168 The impact of these teachings on the individuals who wish
to form their consciences and take concrete steps in a manner consis-
tent with the pastoral letter, however, is a matter which was not dis-
cussed, nor even considered by the bishops as they formulated their
suggestions.169 In the view of this writer, such an omission is unfortu-
nate, not because these considerations should change the moral
precepts which govern issues of war and peace-they should not-but
because real people have been urged by their religious leaders to make
real life "personal, professional and financial choices"' 7 ° with legal
significance based upon the teachings in the pastoral letter. Merely
"rul[ing] out certain uses of nuclear weapons, while also expressing
conditional moral acceptance for deterrence" does not give clear gui-
dance to the individual who must make practical decisions which will
inevitably have an impact on family and career. If the Bishops did
"not presume or pretend that clear answers exist to many of these
personal, professional and financial choices," they should have stated
a bit more clearly the moral principles upon which the "average"
Catholic worker (if such an individual exists) might base those judg-
ments. They have done so in other contexts, including that of abor-
166. Id.
167. Id. Best v. California Apprenticeship Council, 161 Cal. App. 3d 626, 207 Cal. Rptr.
863 (1984).
168. See, e.g., PEACE IN A NUCLEAR AGE: THE BISHOPS' PASTORAL LETrER IN PERSPEC-
TIVE (C. Reid ed. 1986) and sources cited therein. See also sources cited in note 126 supra.
169. Note 110, supra.
170. The Challenge of Peace 318.
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tion-the other great evil condemned in the letter 7 -and it should
not have been an unreasonable task for them to have done so for those
who hold jobs at levels of the defense industry which are only re-
motely connected to that which is clearly immoral.
That such guidelines were not spelled out in the text of the letter
is understandable given the breadth of the undertaking. Nonetheless,
such guidance is necessary at a time when individual believers are
subjected to varying interpretations of the letter's content by church
leaders, theologians, religious commentators and representatives of
the electronic and print media. Whose interpretation is one to be-
lieve? This question is a significant one indeed for the believer who
intends to take steps which might affect his or her future.
The law requires a that the individual must demonstrate that a
burden exists on a sincerely held religious belief in order to claim the
protection of the constitutional provisions and laws of the United
States which forbid discrimination on the basis of religion. 72 For
Catholics who traditionally rely on their bishops to articulate the
moral principles they are to apply, it will be difficult to rely on the
pastoral letter unless the affected individual can articulate, even
roughly, why his or her Catholic faith mandates the course of action
chosen.' 73 The law looks dimly on exemptions from social obligations
based on mere philosophical or political points of view, 74 and
Catholics who intend to rely on the text of the letter for support
would be well advised to seek some pastoral guidance in the process of
forming their respective consciences if they intend to take a position
which goes farther than the letter itself. While civil courts may not
question the veracity or consistency of a religious view,' 75it is critical
that the believer be able to explain it in terms which are religious in
nature. Their own personal philosophy concerning nuclear weapons
will not be enough.
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